View Point

Commentary on new developments in human rights law published in the Human Rights Digest newsletter.

On April 16, 2010, the Globe and Mail wrote about David Arnot’s recent recommendation that the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal be eliminated and all human rights complaints be sent to the Court of Queen’s Bench.

According to the Globe and Mail, Arnot, Saskatchewan’s Chief Commissioner and a judge himself, “raises legitimate concerns about the resources and abilities of the tribunals. Tribunal members tend to be political appointees without the security of tenure. This, combined with an accompanying lack of legal resources and expertise, shortchanges the system and erodes public confidence….Putting cases directly in the hands of experienced judges would immediately boost the credibility of the human rights process in all provinces”.

These arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Tribunal members, of course, are political appointees, as are chief commissioners, judges, ombudspersons, and auditors-general. Do tribunal members have adequate security of tenure to be considered independent? The requirements for considering a Tribunal independent and impartial were thoroughly canvassed in Bell Canada v. C.T.E.A. (46 C.H.R.R. D/495). In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal was independent because its members had fixed terms and their remuneration was not determined by their performance on the Tribunal. What is necessary to ensure that a Tribunal is independent and impartial is settled law. Saskatchewan’s system complies with the criteria set out by the Supreme Court of Canada.

If it is true that the Tribunal lacks legal resources or expertise, who is responsible? The Government of Saskatchewan controls the appointments and allocates the resources. If Saskatchewan does not have an effective Tribunal right now, and this claim may be spurious, the Government has only itself to blame. At different times, governments of different political stripes have sabotaged their own human rights institutions – by starving them of resources, by appointing people to commission or tribunal positions who lack courage or commitment. It is an old political trick of governments to turn on watch-dog institutions that they have themselves deliberately undermined, declare them dysfunctional, and eliminate them.

Putting cases directly in the hands of “experienced” judges is a bad idea, for a number of reasons. First, as University of Saskatchewan professor Ken Norman has pointed out in his op ed piece in the Saskatoon Star Phoenix, compared with a Tribunal member who hears only human rights cases, a judge will simply never acquire the same level of specialized expertise — thus, “experienced” is a misnomer.

Second, how are human rights complainants going to deal with courts? At this point the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission represents complainants at adjudication. The B.C. experience is that going to adjudication without legal representation means losing. The 2006-2007 Annual Report of the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal noted that in every case where the respondent had legal representation and the complainant did not, the complainant lost. That is, before a tribunal. How much more difficult will it be for complainants to take human rights cases to court without legal representation? Saskatchewan Justice Minister Don Morgan is dealing with this as though it is a minor, not a central issue. But access to justice for human rights complainants is at risk all over Canada, and now certainly in Saskatchewan.

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Is it time to go into worry mode about Canada’s human rights commissions? The Canadian Human Rights Commission is closing three regional offices. Some fear that will mean that the Canadian Commission will withdraw even further from direct contact with the communities of people who need its protection. The Public Service Alliance attributes the closure of these offices to Stephen Harper, but the Secretary General has said that it was a decision of the Commission itself.

Accepting that this is case, there is still reason to worry about the attitude of the federal government towards human rights, and human rights institutions. In 1999 when Stephen Harper was the head of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation he told B.C. Report that “Human rights commissions, as they are evolving, are an attack on our fundamental freedoms and the basic existence of a democratic society... It is in fact totalitarianism. I find this is very scary stuff". He has done nothing in the last decade to indicate that he has recused himself from this position.

In another new development, the Government of Saskatchewan is considering closing down the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal and sending human rights complaints to the provincial courts for adjudication, apparently with the blessing of Chief Commissioner David Arnot, who is a judge of the provincial court himself. The ostensible reason for scrapping the Tribunal is that, according to Justice Minister Don Morgan, "there are criticisms that the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal may be seen as too close to the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission".

“Too close” means biased; presumably the Tribunal is biased in favour of arguments made by the Commission. But what is the evidence that in Saskatchewan, or in any other jurisdiction, there is a bias in favour of Commissions on the part of human rights tribunals that can only be solved by sending complaints to the court.

Of course, the effect of sending complaints to the courts is to send them to bodies that, because the majority of their workload lies elsewhere, have little or no human rights expertise. But this is an old standard too. Ignorance of human rights is called ‘neutrality’.

Human rights bodies have always been criticized for being biased. They are, necessarily, biased in favour of human rights. They cannot be neutral about human rights, except with respect to how any particular case will turn out. For those who are resistant to dealing with the transformation of society that human rights entails, dedication to the fulfillment of human rights commitments is called ‘bias’.

That is why 'worry mode’ may be the right setting. This seems to be a time when criticism of human rights, or human rights institutions, need not be factual, reasonable, or constructive. The media likes emotional, angry claims, which depict human rights institutions as authoritarian, frightening, and intrusive, as Harper did more than a decade ago.

Unfortunately, human rights institutions, in an effort to counteract the perception that they are ‘biased’ have become distanced from the organizations and leaders in the community who are also dedicated to the fulfillment of human rights. Nonetheless, those organizations and leaders probably need to speak up regularly now to protect Canada’s human rights institutions.

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Women’s right to be free from sex discrimination in pay continues to falter. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal decided in Boychuk v. Saskatchewan (Social Services) (No. 2)  (CHRR Doc. 09-2967) that s. 16 of the Saskatchewan Code, which prohibits sex discrimination in the terms and conditions of  employment, does not guarantee that women and men will be paid the same when they perform work of equal value. The ruling seems to turn on the fact that the Human Rights Commission has been given neither the resources nor the regulatory framework to effectively implement a pay equity regime. If that is the case, the Government of Saskatchewan has a clear responsibility, under international human rights law, to legislate to fill the void.

For thirty years, Canada has been a signatory to international human rights treaties that commit Canada to ensuring that women receive equal pay for work of equal value. Nonetheless, there are still not laws in place in every jurisdiction to implement that right. Only in Ontario, Quebec, and the federal sector are there pay equity laws applying to both public and private sector employers. In Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, there are pay equity laws that apply to some public sector employers. In B.C., Alberta, Newfoundland, Nunavut and Saskatchewan, there are no pay equity laws.

In 2003, when the United NationsCommittee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women reviewed Canada’s human rights performance, it urged Canada to fully implement women’s right to equal pay for work of equal value in all jurisdictions. But governments have not responded.

At the federal level, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has refused to implement the recommendations of the 2004 Pay Equity Task Force, which was appointed to design much-needed changes to the federal pay equity system. In addition, in the 2009 Budget, he introduced the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act, which, in effect, takes away the right of women federal public servants to equal pay for work of equal value. The legislation authorizes the federal government to assess its own pay practices by taking into account, among other things, the market value of particular skills. Since the point of pay equity schemes is to correct for structural discrimination in the market, the Conservatives have emptied pay equity of meaning. 

Nor have courts and tribunals been a lot of help. For example, in 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada sacrificed women’s right to equal pay to an unexamined government claim of “fiscal crisis” in NAPE v. Newfoundland (2004 SCC 66). And in 2009, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Walden (CHRR Doc. 09-0927) refused to provide a remedy to 431 women public servants who had been discriminated against in pay since 1978, because it found it difficult to calculate the amount of the wage loss. In both cases, the fundamental right of women to be treated equally with respect to pay was given short shrift.

Canada has a weak record on equal pay for women, with the 5th highest gender wage gap among 22 OECD countries. Neither governments nor legal institutions have acted effectively, and with conviction, to implement this right.

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A recent decision of a Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry has provided some guidance on how to fashion a remedy for a person who is forced into retirement. In the Theriault case (Conseil scolaire acadien provincial v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Comm.)), the Board Chair, Donald Murray, had previously decided that Mr. Theriault was discriminated against on the basis of age when he was forced to retire at age 65 (CHRR Doc. 08-553). The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal (CHRR Doc. 09-2272) confirmed the decision and the matter came back to the Board of Inquiry for a remedy hearing in the fall of 2009 (CHRR Doc.09-2593).

What is the remedy for being forced into retirement or, as stated by the Board, “what order of money will rectify the injury that Mr. Theriault suffered as a result of his wrongful mandatory retirement at the end of April, 2005?” This case sets out a good framework for quantifying special damages, including assessing lost income (with relevant deductions), loss of pension benefits, and losses from having to transfer registered retirement savings plans on retirement. In considering special damages, the central issue is determining the length of time that the person would have worked had he/she not been mandatorily retired. Most of the special damages flow from this date. With respect to duty to mitigate, the Board found that there was no duty at the age of 65 to search for employment beyond the chosen community. This appears to reflect the reality that it may not be reasonable for an older employee to uproot themselves in order to find employment. It also demonstrates the individual nature of remedy in human rights cases — a younger person in different circumstances may be expected to relocate in order to find work, but an older person may not.

This decision provides a valuable analysis for the importance of work and the discriminatory nature of forced retirement. There were various aspects of harm taken into account when assessing the appropriate general damages to award, including emotional harm, affront to personal dignity and financial instability; that is, the financial disruption that took place with the forced retirement as opposed to a planned retirement.

The Board also discussed the nature of age discrimination. Is age discrimination somehow different from gender or racial discrimination and, therefore, not appropriate for general damages? The Board rejected all arguments suggesting that age discrimination was not as “insidious or as socially-loaded or as historically entrenched as gender and racial discrimination” and noted that human rights law is about prohibiting the making of life-affecting decisions based on irrelevant personal characteristics over which a person has no control. As forced retirement is a life-affecting decision based on a person’s age, it is appropriate for general damages. There is no difference in the personal experience of discrimination whether it is based on age, race or gender.

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Employers could be worried about family status complaints. Many job requirements can conflict with family responsibilities. How can we determine when that conflict amounts to discrimination? The Human Rights Panel of Alberta recently wrestled with this issue in Rawleigh v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (No. 1) (68 C.H.R.R. D/172) and ruled in favour of the complainant.

The Panel decided that Mr. Rawleigh’s case could meet the standard set by the B.C. Court of Appeal in Health Sciences Assn. of British Columbia v. Campbell River and North Island Transition Society (50 C.H.R.R. D/140). That Court ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination based on family status is made out “when a change in a term or condition of employment results in a serious interference with a substantial parental duty of the employee”.

Mr. Rawleigh believed that he had an exemption from the requirement on general clerks in the Safeway stores to rotate onto night shifts for four-week periods several times a year. However, with almost no notice, he was informed that he was expected to start working nights. He had sought an exemption from the night shift requirement because his wife was losing her vision, had already become legally blind, and had a particularly difficult time functioning at night. They had three young children who required supervision, no available network of family and friends who could assist them for periods as long as four weeks at a time, and they could not afford to pay for additional help.

Some adjudicators have found that the Campbell River standard for family status discrimination is “inordinately high” because it requires that there be a change in working conditions which creates a conflict with a family responsibility, and an interference with a family obligation that is serious. The Human Rights Panel of Alberta seemed to agree that this standard might be too high. Although the Panel used the Campbell River test, it made a point of disagreeing with the B.C. Court of Appeal in its comments.

The B.C. Court had warned that an “an open-ended concept of family status would have the potential to cause disruption and great mischief in the workplace”. But the Panel warned, to the contrary, that it is dangerous and discriminatory to believe that the ground ‘family status’ will open a Pandora’s box of opportunistic complaints. The Panel emphasized the need to weigh the unique circumstances of each family status case.

Mr. Rawleigh’s circumstances were certainly compelling. He had recently become the sole income earner in his family. His wife could not continue to work as a teacher because of her loss of vision. Because they had young children, no other unpaid caregiver, and no other resources, the requirement that Mr. Rawleigh rotate onto night shifts was a requirement that he could not meet. He simply could not maintain the fragile balance between work and home responsibilities if he had to work nights.

Canada Safeway’s only offer of accommodation was to transfer him to a cashier’s position — which has no night shift requirement — with a cut in pay. Employers can worry about how far they will have to go to accommodate employees’ family responsibilities. Clearly, they will have to go farther than this.

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In an unexpected decision, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled, in Warman v. Lemire (No. 18) (68 C.H.R.R. D/205) that s. 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act violates the right to freedom of expression in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 13 prohibits communicating messages, via telephone or internet, that will expose individuals or groups to hatred or contempt because of race, religion or other protected characteristics. Although the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1990 in Canada (Human Rights Comm.) v. Taylor (13 C.H.R.R. D/435) that s. 13 was a reasonable limit on the right to freedom of expression, the Tribunal decided that the nature of s. 13 has changed, and its constitutionality should be revisited.

Prior to 1998, if s. 13 was breached, a Tribunal could only issue a cease and desist order. The 1998 amendments did not change s. 13, but added ss. 54 and 54.1(1) which permit a Tribunal to award special damages to an individual who is recklessly harmed, or to levy a fine up to $10,000.

The Tribunal found that the introduction of the fine changed s. 13 from a “conciliatory, preventative, and remedial” provision, as the Court saw it in 1990, into a punitive provision, which has created a “potential ‘chill’ upon free expression”. The Tribunal ruled that s. 13, with the new penalty provisions attached, is no longer a minimal impairment of the right to freedom of speech.

In its history since 1977, s. 13 has been used mainly against prominent white supremacists who have made careers of promoting hatred against Jews, and persons who are not white — John Ross Taylor, Ernst Zündel and others. Most people would agree with the Taylor Court that s. 13 has important work to do in a society committed to egalitarian values, and that it has done that work cautiously. “Exposing to hatred or contempt” has been defined so that it constrains only the most virulent expression. And not even the post-1998 penalty provisions have very sharp teeth. In the twelve cases in which penalties have been awarded since 2001, the penalties ranged from $1,000 to $8,000.

It is difficult to see that penalties of this magnitude turn s. 13 into an egregious assault on freedom of expression. Without the penalty provisions, the only remedy attached to s. 13 will be a cease and desist order — never a very effective remedy against those who are determined purveyors of racial and religious hatred. 

The complaints about Mark Steyn’s MacLean’s magazine article about the “rising influence of Islam” broke the pattern of complaints being filed almost solely against Canada’s white supremacists. The Steyn complaints unleashed a media hysteria, and in its swirl Canada’s modest and carefully enforced anti-hate provisions have been transmogrified into giant threats to freedom of speech.

But the complaints against Mark Steyn’s article were thrown out because the Canadian and Ontario Human Rights Commissions and the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal (Elmasry v. Rogers Publishing Ltd. (No. 4), 64 C.H.R.R. D/509) found that the article did not expose a group to hatred. Surely, we should conclude from this that the system works and refrain from dismantling it. Given the record of the interpretation and application of anti-hate provisions in human rights legislation, it is hard to find the recent outcry against either s. 13, or the penalty provisions, persuasive.

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The Walden case has a startling outcome (67 C.H.R.R. D/275). Although the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled in 2007 (64 C.H.R.R. D/215) that the 431 nurses who worked as “medical adjudicators” for the Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefits Program had been paid less than doctors, called “medical advisors”, who performed substantially the same work, the women got no award for wage loss.  In its recent decision on remedy, the Tribunal decided that the complainants had not provided reliable evidence of the existence or extent of the wage gap, and it declined to make any award.

The employer in this case is the federal government, which employs almost 400,000 people across the country, more than half of them women. Its employment practices matter. In 2007 the Tribunal found that the federal government had refused, since March 1978, to “recognize the professional nature of the work performed by the medical adjudicators in a manner proportionate to the professional recognition accorded to the work of the medical advisors”. This was a discriminatory practice within the meaning of both ss. 7 and 10. “The effects of the practice”, the Tribunal said, “have been to deprive the adjudicators of professional recognition and remuneration commensurate with their qualifications, and to deprive them of payment of their licensing fees, as well as training and career advancement opportunities on the same basis as the advisors”.

But at the hearing on remedy, the Tribunal accepted the employer’s proposal for a new job classification for the medical adjudicators, but did not accept the complainants’ expert report estimating the wage loss. The complainants’ expert estimated that the wage gap between the advisors and the adjudicators that was due to sex discrimination was 25 – 35 percent. The expert said that he would have liked more time and more information for his study, and agreed that his findings involved some speculation. The Tribunal concluded that the results of his study were not reasonably accurate.

Admittedly, establishing the amount of a wage loss can be a complex exercise.  But some speculation is always involved. Sometimes the speculation is about how much work would have been available from the respondent employer, and whether a particular complainant would have been in a position to do it. In this case, some estimating was also required, about how much of the wage difference was due to different duties and how much to sex discrimination.

An interim decision by the Tribunal that further analysis was required to make a reasonable estimate would have been understandable. But to award nothing to the 431 women in this case is a different matter. If there is no remedy for the violation of the right to equal pay, the right itself loses meaning. The Commission asked the Tribunal to retain jurisdiction, if it did not accept the complainants’ expert report, and direct the employers to undertake a job evaluation study. But the Tribunal refused to do so. Although the employers have discriminated against the women adjudicators since 1978, the Tribunal ruled that the employers were entitled to closure. Apparently, the women were not.

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Human rights commissions, and human rights themselves, are under attack from mainstream media and conservative commentators. Jennifer Lynch, Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, recently urged members of the human rights community to defend the human rights of vulnerable people and to ensure that discussion about human rights commissions is informed and respectful (Conference of the Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies, June 15, 2009).

To respond to these attacks, it is important to consider their ideological underpinnings. A typical example is an op ed piece by Tom Flanagan, published by The Globe and Mail recently (Tuesday, May 19, 2009, p. A13). Mr. Flanagan’s treasured point is that governments (here in the form of human rights institutions and human rights law) should not interfere in the market or social relations. Tom Flanagan, and others, hold an Americanized view that government intervention to correct discrimination is, by definition, abusive.

Flanagan says that the very existence of human rights commissions is an abuse.  They enforce anti-discrimination laws, not real rights like freedom of speech and worship, and ownership of property. The market should be allowed to take care of discrimination without government interference, says Flanagan. Although competitive markets may not immediately abolish discriminatory practices, they tend to erode them over time by making discrimination unprofitable.

For the proposition that the market will – over time – take care of discrimination on its own, no evidence is offered. The evidence indicates the opposite. The market likes discrimination, as it searches perpetually for a cheaper pool of labour. Workers who are more vulnerable, because of sex or race or country of origin, work for less money, in worse conditions.  For example, the Latin American workers who came to Vancouver on temporary visas to build the tunnel for the new Canada Line were paid less than European workers, also on temporary visas. The employer claimed that this was due to its “international pay practices”. A human rights tribunal (C.S.W.U., Local 1611 v. SELI Canada Inc. (No. 8), CHRR Doc. 08-935) concluded that “international pay practices” simply meant that SELI Inc. had found that it could pay workers from countries with low wage rates less money than workers from countries with high wage rates, even when they work in Canada. According to Mr. Flanagan, it is an abuse for a human rights tribunal to interfere in this discrimination.

Tom Flanagan’s article illustrates that at the centre of the equality project is a struggle between contending views of the role of government: governments should be a redistributive, egalitarian force, intervening in the market and in social relations to correct discrimination vs. governments should be “hands off”, permitting the market and social relations to control the distribution of benefits in our society.

If, as members of the human rights community, we are going to defend commissions and human rights, we should be prepared to address this central issue. For Tom Flanagan, restraining government is the only human rights task. But human rights commissions and human rights laws rest on the understanding that equality requires governments to use both the force of law and public resources to eliminate discrimination.

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As more human rights cases challenge government benefit schemes, more decisions revolve around determinations of what the service is and who is the “public” to whom it is provided.

Two recent B.C. cases illustrate the centrality and contentiousness of these issues. Governments are making every effort to ensure that the parameters of services remain as they have defined them, undisturbed by claims of discrimination. A standard argument now is that the service in question is one that is simply not provided to those who claim to be discriminated against, as though that is a full answer.

One case, recently decided by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal (J. and J. on behalf of R. (No. 2), 66 C.H.R.R. D/341), is about children with developmental disabilities. A 15-year-old boy was refused the services of a youth worker to help him improve his social skills on the grounds that his IQ was above 70, rather than below 70. The argument of the government agency, Community Living British Columbia (“CLBC”), was that the boy was not a member of the public it serves. The agency decided to set the parameters for its service by using the definition of “mental retardation” from the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association, which states that one of the criteria of “mental retardation” is an IQ of 70 or less.

The Tribunal in this case went to the heart of the issue. It said:

to allow this position to be determinative of the question of whether R was a member of the public to whom CLBC customarily provides services would be essentially circular, as it would mean that CLBC by employing a set of eligibility criteria which have the effect of excluding R from services, is able to thereby define the public to whom it customarily provides services, and immunize the application of those eligibility criteria to R from human rights review.

While the Tribunal rejected this defeating circularity, the B.C. Supreme Court embraced it in McGrath (66 C.H.R.R. D/376), a case about grandmothers who have assumed legal custody of their grandchildren because the parents are incapable of caring for them. As grandmothers, they receive $271 per month for the care of a “child in the residence of a relative”, while as foster parents they would receive about $800 per month for the care of the same child. The B.C. Supreme Court found that the Tribunal erred by not dismissing the grandmothers’ complaints. The Court said they “sought something not contemplated by the legislative scheme”. As custodial parents, they were not a part of the “public”served by the Child, Family and Community Services Act, and could not compare themselves to foster parents.

The Tribunal apparently erred in finding that it could consider what the true nature of the service being provided was, and scrutinize the legislated parameters of the service for compliance with the Code. But surely the Tribunal’s more purposive analysis was warranted. Human rights guarantees are intended to foster scrutiny of where the boundaries for any particular benefit have been set. When government arguments are circular, and defeating to the purpose of human rights guarantees, they should not be endorsed.

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Meiorin (35 C.H.R.R. D/257) and Grismer (36 C.H.R.R. D/129) made it more difficult for respondents to demonstrate that they have discharged the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. Perhaps because of this, respondents are putting new pressure on the steps in the discrimination analysis that precede the undue hardship analysis. Adjudicators and courts are being pushed to analyze meticulously whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established before complainants can get to the undue hardship stage.

In a decision from the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (65 C.H.R.R. D/392), the Court upheld a ruling of the Human Right Panel (CHRR Doc. 07-385) dismissing a complaint in which Robert Baum alleged that the City of Calgary failed to accommodate his disability, on the grounds that Mr. Baum did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Mr. Baum was a millwright and he worked for the City of Calgary for more than 20 years. In 2001, he was disabled by osteoarthritis to the point where he could not perform his millwright duties. Mr. Baum complained that when it was clear that he needed an alternative job, a proper assessment of his capacities was delayed, he was offered inappropriate positions, and, in general, the search for accommodation was slow and ineffective. In 2006, he found an alternative job outside the City and resigned.

Relying on the minority concurring decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in McGill University Health Centre (59 C.H.R.R. D/259), the Alberta Court said that Mr. Baum had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not demonstrated that the employer’s conduct was based on “stereotypical or arbitrary assumptions about persons with disabilities”.

Because, in the failed search for an alternative position for Mr. Baum, there was no stereotype operating, the Court said that there was no discrimination. Following this logic seems to mean that any search for accommodation, no matter how lackadaisical and protracted, does not contravene human rights law, unless overt stereotypes are operating in reviewing which jobs would be appropriate.

This looks like an inappropriate insertion of the requirement to find a stereotype into the duty to accommodate analysis. Most disability employment cases are grounded in a stereotype of the “normal worker”, who is able-bodied and the preferred candidate for every job. Mr. Baum fell afoul of this stereotype at the point when his disabilities became severe enough that he could no longer work as a millwright. He was adversely affected by the “normal” requirements of his job, which he could not meet because of his disability, and he stood to lose his employment unless he could be accommodated in an alternative position. This should have gotten him through the prima facie discrimination stage.

The appropriate question was: did the employer accommodate Mr. Baum to the point of undue hardship? The answer to that question appears to have been no. The City had not found him an appropriate alternative job, nor had it even claimed that it could not do so because of undue hardship. Requiring a search for stereotypes was inappropriate here.

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